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     _________________ 
 
 OPINION**  
_________________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. (“Merck”) appeals the District Court’s order denying 
its motion to compel individual arbitration and stay proceedings of a putative antitrust class 
action lawsuit filed by Sugartown Pediatrics, LLC, Schwartz Pediatrics S.C., and Margiotti 
& Kroll Pediatrics, P.C. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).1  For the reasons that follow, we will 
vacate and remand for further proceedings.   
I.  Background 
 Plaintiffs are pediatric medical practices that, between 2014 and 2018, were 
members of two Physician Buying Groups, Main Street Vaccines and CCPA Purchasing 
Partners, L.L.C. (collectively, the “PBGs”).  Plaintiffs authorized the PBGs to negotiate 
contracts with vaccine manufacturers such as Merck for the sale and purchase of vaccines 
through signed membership agreements.2  Acting pursuant to the membership agreements, 
the PBGs entered into contracts with Merck, which set forth pricing for the sale and 
purchase of vaccines at discounted rates (the “PBG Contracts”).  The PBG Contracts 
                                              
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Although Margiotti & Kroll Pediatrics, P.C. filed a separate action, its action was 
consolidated into this action on September 5, 2018. 
2 The membership agreement between Merck and Main Street Vaccines specifically 
provided that the “member practice” agreed to participate “in a vaccine purchasing 
contract with Merck Vaccines (Merck).”  In re Rotavirus Vaccines Antitrust Litig., 362 F. 
Supp. 3d 255, 263 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2019). 
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contained the following arbitration provision: “Any controversy, claim or dispute arising 
out of or relating to the performance, construction, interpretation or enforcement of this 
Agreement shall, if not resolved through negotiations between the parties, be submitted to 
mandatory binding confidential arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act . . . .”3  
Although Plaintiffs were not signatories to the PBG Contracts, they chose to purchase 
RotaTeq Rotavirus vaccines directly from Merck at the discounted pricing set forth in the 
PBG Contracts.   
Unhappy with Merck’s pricing, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit against 
Merck under the Sherman Act4 alleging that “Merck leverages its monopoly power in 
multiple pediatric vaccine markets to maintain its monopoly power in the Rotavirus 
Vaccine Market and, consequently, to charge supracompetitive prices to purchasers of its 
rotavirus vaccines.”5  Plaintiffs further allege that Merck “coopted the PBGs . . . to impose 
and enforce its anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct.”6    
Merck moved to compel individual arbitration and stay proceedings pursuant to the 
arbitration provisions in the PBG Contracts.  Merck argued that, although Plaintiffs did not 
sign the PBG Contracts, they are nonetheless required to arbitrate their claims under 
principles of agency law and equitable estoppel.  Without the benefit of discovery or notice 
to the parties, the District Court applied the summary judgment standard and denied the 
motion.  The District Court considered the PBG Contracts and membership agreements, 
                                              
3 Id. at 259.  Both PBG Contracts at issue contain identical arbitration provisions. 
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. 
5 J.A. 31.   
6 J.A. 54.   
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and concluded that “without more” it could not find that Merck met its burden of 
establishing an agency relationship as a matter of law.7  The District Court also concluded 
that Plaintiffs were not equitably estopped from litigating their claims against Merck 
because Merck failed to make the “requisite showing of relatedness or congruence . . . .”8  
This appeal followed.  
II. Standard of Review9 
We review the District Court’s denial of an order compelling arbitration de novo, 
since it presents a question of law.10  “We apply the same standard as the District Court, so 
‘we are first obliged to determine which standard should have been applied.’”11 
III.  Discussion 
In considering arbitration agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 
“we have recognized that ‘[a]rbitration is strictly a matter of contract.  If a party has not 
agreed to arbitrate, the courts have no authority to mandate that he do so.’”12  Where there 
is no express arbitration agreement between the parties, we have repeatedly held “that a 
                                              
7 In re Rotavirus, 362 F. Supp. 3d at 263. 
8 Id. at 264. 
9 The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B).   
10 Reading Health Sys. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 900 F.3d 87, 100 n.61 (3d Cir. 2018). 
11 Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., 939 F.3d 210, 217 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Guidotti v. Legal 
Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2013)).   
12 Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, 769 F.3d 215, 219–20 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Bel-Ray 
Co., Inc. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999)).   
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party, despite being a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement, may be equitably bound 
to arbitrate ‘under traditional principles of contract and agency law.’”13   
However, to determine whether Plaintiffs, as non-signatories to the PBG Contracts, 
should be required to arbitrate, we must first determine the standard to be applied in 
deciding the motion to compel arbitration.  In Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, 
L.L.C., we held that “when it is apparent, based on the face of a complaint, and documents 
relied upon in the complaint, that certain of a party’s claims are subject to an enforceable 
arbitration clause, a motion to compel arbitration should be considered under a Rule 
12(b)(6) standard without discovery’s delay.”14  “But if the complaint and its supporting 
documents are unclear regarding the agreement to arbitrate, or if the plaintiff has responded 
to a motion to compel arbitration with additional facts sufficient to place the agreement to 
arbitrate in issue, then the parties should be entitled to discovery on the question of 
arbitrability before a court entertains further briefing on [the] question.”15   
Merck argues that the District Court should have decided its motion to compel 
arbitration under the motion to dismiss standard or, at the least, allowed the parties to 
engage in limited discovery on the issue of arbitrability.  Merck relies upon the relationship 
between Plaintiffs and the PBGs to assert that the PBGs acted as Plaintiffs’ agents in their 
negotiations with Merck and thus Plaintiffs should be required to arbitrate their claims.  
                                              
13 Id. at 220 (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin 
Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 194–95 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
14 716 F.3d at 776 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
15 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7 
 
While the District Court properly declined to apply the motion to dismiss standard, it 
should have allowed limited discovery on the issue of arbitrability.   
The District Court properly declined to apply the motion to dismiss standard 
because it is not apparent from the Complaint that Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to the PBG 
Contracts’ arbitration provisions.  The Complaint reveals that the PBGs entered into 
contracts with Merck that provided for the purchase of Merck vaccines at discounted 
pricing.  Plaintiffs do not dispute that they were members of the PBGs and that they 
purchased vaccines from Merck at the pricing set forth in the PBG Contracts.  However, 
the Complaint does not mention any arbitration agreement.  Further, Plaintiffs deny 
knowledge of the arbitration provisions in the PBG Contracts,16 and dispute the PBGs’ 
authority to agree to arbitration.  Therefore, the District Court properly declined to employ 
the motion to dismiss standard.17   
However, the District Court should have allowed the parties to engage in limited 
discovery before applying the summary judgment standard.  Under Pennsylvania law, an 
agency relationship exists where there is “(1) manifestation by the principal that the agent 
shall act for him; (2) the acceptance of the undertaking by the agent; and (3) the control of 
the endeavor in the hands of the principal.”18  The Complaint sheds little light on the precise 
                                              
16 But see Rosenberry v. Evans, 48 A.3d 1255, 1262 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (“We 
acknowledge that it is well settled in the law of this jurisdiction that knowledge of an 
agent, acting within the scope of his authority, real or apparent, may be imputed to the 
principal, and therefore, knowledge of the agent is knowledge of the principal.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
17 See Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 774. 
18 Tribune-Review Publ’g Co. v. Westmoreland Cty. Hous. Auth., 833 A.2d 112, 119–20 
(Pa. 2003) (citing Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 761 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 2000)).   
8 
 
relationship between Plaintiffs and the PBGs.  Even taking the membership agreements 
and PBG Contracts into consideration, it is unclear whether an agency relationship exists 
as a matter of law.  While the membership agreements explicitly delegate authority for the 
PBGs to negotiate pricing with Merck, they do not shed light on the level of control 
Plaintiffs exercised over the PBGs in performance of their delegated authority.  The PBG 
Contracts similarly do not define the scope of control Plaintiffs exercised over the PBGs.   
Because arbitrability is not apparent on the face of the Complaint, limited discovery 
on the issue of arbitrability is appropriate, after which Merck may file a renewed motion 
to compel arbitration.19  
IV.  Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s Order denying 
Merck’s motion to compel arbitration and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.20 
 
 
                                              
19 Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 776. 
20 We note that the District Court appears to have applied the wrong test in analyzing 
Merck’s equitable estoppel argument.  As the District Court properly recognized, in E.I. 
DuPont., we outlined two theories under which equitable estoppel may apply to bind a non-
signatory to an arbitration clause.  269 F.3d at 199.  The District Court applied the test for 
when a non-signatory attempts to bind a signatory to an arbitration agreement.  However, 
because this case involves a signatory attempting to bind a non-signatory, the correct test 
to be applied is whether “the non-signatory knowingly exploits the agreement containing 
the arbitration clause despite having never signed the agreement.”  Id.  We leave it to the 
District Court to decide on remand whether it needs to evaluate this theory of equitable 
estoppel to resolve the motion to compel. 
